Titre : | Connections : The Quarterly journal : The “Rise” of China in the Eyes of Russia: A Source of Threats or New Opportunities? |
Auteurs : | Anastasia Solomentseva ; Yulia Nikitinа ; Denis Alexeev |
Type de document : | Thesis |
Editeur : | Garmisch-Partenkirchen : PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, 2014 |
Article en page(s) : | I, 147 p. |
Langues: | Anglais |
Catégories : | |
Tags : | International relations ; Political leadership ; International economic relations ; China--Foreign relations--Russia ; Russia--Foreign relations--China ; China--International economic relations--Russia ; Russia--International economic relations--China ; Russia (Federation)--Foreign relations--China ; China--Foreign relations--Russia (Federation) ; Georgia (Republic)--History--Rose Revolution, 2003 ; Ukraine--History--Orange Revolution, 2004 ; Kyrgyzstan--History--Tulip Revolution, 2005 ; Arab Spring, 2010- ; Protest movements--Former Soviet republics ; Democratization--Former Soviet republics ; Soviet Union--Politics and government ; Russia (Federation)--Social conditions ; Russia (Federation)--Foreign relations |
Résumé : |
Zheng Bijian went on to repeatedly express this idea in other speeches and publications. Since early 2003 the term "peaceful rise" has been actively used by leading figures of the Politburo of the PRC Communist Party, and in 2005 an article about it by Zheng Bijian was published in the American journal Foreign Affairs.2 3 At its core, the concept of "peaceful rise" generally came down to three basic propositions. [...]China has begun to demonstrate a greater interest in multilateral interaction to address some issues, thereby relegating its previous focus on bilateral cooperation to the back burner.
----------------------------------- The “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet space were initially understood to mean the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004) and Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005). The one feature these events share is considered to be the non-violent nature of the regime change resulting from mass protests. The 2010 revolution in Kyrgyzstan may also be relegated to this group of cases: although the revolution was not entirely peaceful it nonetheless led to a change in the country’s leadership. Somewhat less clear are regime change attempts or mass protests, for example the situation in Andijan (Uzbekistan) in 2005 or the mass protests and riots in Moldova in 2009. It is still unclear whether the power shift in Ukraine in February 2014 should be considered a “color revolution;” there is also no precise definition of the concept of the “Arab spring,” which is usually thought to include the mass upheaval and protests, more often not peaceful, that led (or did not lead) to regime change in a number of countries of the Arab world starting in late 2010. Despite the lack of consensus among political leaders and experts regarding terminology, on the whole the terms “color revolutions” and “Arab spring” have caught on and as a rule are used without further explanation in Russian official discourse in the expert community and in the media. ---------------------------------- The first few months of 2014 brought an unprecedented collapse of the Russian Federation’s image on the world stage, the worst since the end of the Cold War. The events in Ukraine and the reaction to them by a significant number of countries in the international community, quickly demoted Russia to that group of countries whose foreign policy provokes harsh condemnation. For the first time in decades, international sanctions have been put in place against Russia, adopted by a large number of the world’s largest countries, de facto downgrading Russia to the rank of a rogue state; these sanctions are intended to exert pressure on the elite, who are responsible for implementing certain foreign policy decisions. For many experts, the events are associated with a new and sudden sea-change in Russia’s foreign policy. However, it appears to us that the current stage of cooling relations with the West is a logical consequence of the way in which the Russian state was constructed in recent years; in fact, a different scenario could hardly have been anticipated. This article presents the author’s view of the mechanisms and logic that shaped Russia’s foreign policy course, which has evolved through several iterations in the last three years. The below analysis could facilitate a fuller understanding of Russian motives in international relations, and help find opportunities and mechanisms for dialogue between Russia and the West. Vladimir Putin’s new presidential term, which began in 2012, was typified by a significant transformation of Russia’s foreign policy, both with respect to neighboring states, and world politics in general. The majority of pundits tend to link this transformation with domestic, social processes in Russia itself, an increasingly active public and a qualitative transformation of the Russian elite. However, we consider that Russia’s current foreign policy concept is a complex combination of three factors, which are both foreign and domestic: A. The evolution of the political system, which took place as a result of competition between different groups within the Russian elite, over the past 3-5 years. As a result of these processes, Russia’s political spectrum has a complex structure, which includes liberal-economic, conservative-political and oligarchic elements. Competition between these groups is a major factor behind the complex character of Russia’s current foreign policy. B. The Eurasian economic and political integration project which, in the mindset of Russian leaders, is the key to Russian development in the 21st century. Success or failure in implementing the giant steps required to re-integrate post-Soviet space is seen as the main indicator of the effectiveness of the Russian political system today, and its foreign-policy strategies. C. The international security situation, which features a wide range of uncertainties and threats in the Middle and Far East, as well as Central Asia and Afghanistan. |
En ligne : | http://connections-qj.org/article/rise-china-eyes-russia-source-threats-or-new-opportunities |
Exemplaires (1)
Code-barres | Cote | Support | Localisation | Section | Disponibilité |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
303418 | 947 SOL C | Others | Royal Military Academy | Bibliothèque ERM | Disponible |