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Titel: | Analysis and evaluation of operation Iceberg (Okinawa) using the COPD |
Auteurs: | Brian a. Dudas |
Documenttype: | Thesis |
Uitgever : | Brussels [Belgique] : Royal Military Academy, 2013 |
Artikel op pagina: | 1 vol. |
Talen: | Engels |
Tags: | Working paper ; CSEM/HStO 127 |
Abstract : |
In its 60 years of existence, NATO has grown from 12 to 28 member nations and has transitioned from a purely self-defense organization to a regional risk manager. Along the way, it has attempted to encapsulate the best of its members’ tools in prosecuting “Operational Art” as a common framework across its scope of responsibility. The Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) V1.0 represents a shift in focus of planning to better situate the forces of NATO as a single system among other systems during any crisis situation while analyzing elements simultaneously at all three of the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels. The purpose of the COPD is to “outline the military procedures and responsibilities governing the preparation, approval, assessment, implementation and review of operations plans to enable a common approach to operations planning.” It seeks to provide a common framework for collaborative planning not only in a Joint and Combined, but Comprehensive environment, and to provide planners and commanders the tools to appreciate fully all elements of even the most complex of crises.1 On April 1, 1945, Allied Forces in the Pacific invaded the Japanese-controlled island of Okinawa in what proved to be the greatest and last Pacific battle of the Second World War. Despite the inter-service rivalries of the time, the invasion of Okinawa, codenamed “Operation ICEBERG,” has been recognized as the largest and most cooperatively joint operation up to that point in U.S. history. Allied forces faced a well-prepared and dangerous multidimensional threat including the most devastating threat to maritime forces yet encountered, the kamikaze. Despite the overwhelming force available to the Allies, the battle on Okinawa stagnated for 3 long months, resulting in over 72,000 Allied casualties from the multiple components, with 17,400 killed or missing. The heavy losses of this battle of both men and equipment shaped the political will of Allied leadership and drove the use of atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in hopes of averting an even costlier invasion of Japan proper. ICEBERG has long been the study of the students of Operational Art as it provides a wealth of lessons, validates many of the concepts that are used today, and demonstrates the symbiotic benefits of Joint cooperation and collaboration in crisis situations. It has been identified by historians as “an ideal model of campaign design” because it “was the product of continuous assessment of both strategic and operational variables resulting in the eventual fusion of resources previously dedicated to several subordinate campaigns.”2 It provides the ideal opportunity to re-evaluate a large-scale Joint and Combined battle at the operational level using today's collaborative tools, both to validate the tools and to learn how to improve them. The purpose of this study is to develop independently an Operational Design using the processes described in the COPD for juxtaposition with the Allies’ original plan. The goal is not merely to compare the final plans, but also the incremental process results. While the COPD provides guidance for parallel planning along the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, this study focuses on the operational level, and limits itself to creating an Operational Design at the Joint Force Command (JFC) level. To achieve equitable results, it is necessary to remain as true to the new COPD processes as possible; therefore, this paper is structured with the goal of holding the original and reevaluated planning processes along identical parallel paths. The original plan and actual historical events of ICEBERG will not be discussed until after the COPD process has been completed, to diminish the advantage of historical hindsight. Chapter 1 sets the foundation for the planning process, and associate elements, concepts, and players from WWII with their modern counterparts. Chapter 2 sets the stage for operational design with a review of the situation while Chapter 3 conducts a full mission analysis per the COPD. After the Operation Design is formulated in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 describes how ICEBERG was actually planned and executed in 1944-1945, and the comparison with the newly-devised plan reveals the lessons learned from the COPD planning process, with conclusions closing out the study thereafter. The process begins by gaining an understanding of the situation in the strategic context of the day. |
Exemplaren (1)
Barcode | Plaatskenmerk | Documenttype | Locatie | Afdeling | Statuut |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
117470R | RMA Mast CSEM/HStO 127 DIV/30 | Thesis | Royal Military Academy | BIBL ERM Cave | Uitgesloten van ontlening |