|Command and control in military crisis : Devious decisions
|Harald Hoiback ; Hew Strachan, Préfacier, etc.
|Type de document :
|London : Cass, 2003
|Article en page(s) :
|XIV, 146 p.
|Index. décimale :
Breaking with the tradition that literature about the direction and
coordination of military forces should only deal with technology and
procedures, this work also takes into account the underlying domestic
conditions of a conflict, including cultural, personal and political
relations. The book focuses on two instances, where fundamental assumptions
were at loggerheads and provides a theoretical nuts and bolts approach
introduced within the opening chapters. Firstly, the book investigates the
effect of the several armies present in the field without any central
authority during March 1918. It explores how this expensive luxury, as the
Germans threatened to destroy the allied forces, caused internal British
disagreements over strategy which weakened the British Expeditionary Force.
The second case analyses how Norway tumbled into war in 1940. The Norwegian
government had a tacit, incoherent and ill-coordinated plan for how they
should once again keep Norway out of war. As a consequence, the de facto
decision to resist German aggression was in fact taken by a rather
insignificant colonel.This case demonstrates how the underlying conditions of
command and control and not the actual directives from the government were
the historical focus which determined Norway's destiny.
|355.330 41 HOI C
|Royal Military Academy