| Titre : | Armed servants - Agency, oversight, and civil-military relations |
| Auteurs : | Peter d. Feaver |
| Type de document : | Books |
| Editeur : | Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 2003 |
| Article en page(s) : | XI, 381 p. |
| ISBN/ISSN/EAN : | 978-0-674-01051-2 |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Résumé : |
Challenging Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, the authorr proposes a theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nation-state. |
Exemplaires (1)
| Code-barres | Cote | Support | Localisation | Section | Disponibilité |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100296R | SCGW 355.102.1 | Book | Royal Military Academy | Sciences du comportement | Disponible |
