News
In this section, BUDef develops a topical theme in the form of a recent article.
Conflict in Ukraine
‘The time has come’: Calls grow to allow Ukrainian strikes inside Russia
by Peter Dickinson
May 28, 2024
Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago, most of Ukraine’s international allies have insisted that any weapons they provide be used exclusively within Ukrainian territory. These restrictions were initially imposed to prevent a broadening of the conflict, but a growing chorus of critics now say this approach is preventing Ukraine from defending itself and risks enabling Russian victory.
The debate over the use of Western weapons to attack targets inside Russia has rumbled on throughout the war, and has recently been thrust to the top of the agenda by the Russian army’s latest offensive. In early May, Russian troops crossed Ukraine’s northern border and began advancing toward the country’s second city, Kharkiv. This attack was no surprise; on the contrary, Ukrainian military officials had been monitoring preparations on the other side of the border for weeks, but were powerless to act.
Russia’s Kharkiv offensive has highlighted the military absurdity of current restrictions on the use of the Western weapons supplied to Ukraine. Russian commanders are well aware of Ukraine’s inability to strike back, and are actively exploiting the border zone as a safe haven to concentrate forces and launch bombardments. Understandably, this is fueling calls among Ukraine’s allies for a major rethink.
The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is the latest international organization to voice its support for an end to restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western weapons. Lawmakers from all 32 NATO states adopted a declaration on May 27 urging alliance members to allow strikes on military targets inside Russia. “Ukraine can only defend itself if it can attack Russia’s supply lines and Russian bases of operation. It is time to recognize this reality and let Ukraine do what it must,” stated NATO Parliamentary Assembly President Michal Szczerba.
This declaration echoed NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenburg’s May 24 interview with Britain’s The Economist calling on NATO allies to end their prohibition on the use of Western weapons against Russian targets. “The time has come for allies to consider whether they should lift some of the restrictions they have put on the use of weapons they have donated to Ukraine,” commented Stoltenberg. “Especially now when a lot of the fighting is going on in Kharkiv, close to the border, to deny Ukraine the possibility of using these weapons against legitimate military targets on Russian territory makes it very hard for them to defend themselves.”
A number of senior Western officials have also recently backed an end to restrictions. During an early May visit to Kyiv, UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron announced that Ukraine had the “right” to use British-supplied weapons for attacks inside Russia. Speaking in Germany on May 27, French President Emmanuel Macron noted that Ukraine was being attacked from Russia. “We must allow them to take out the military sites the missiles are fired from,” he commented. The following day, Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren said the present ban was forcing Ukraine to fight “with one hand tied behind its back” and argued that lifting restrictions “should not be subject to debate.”
Not everyone is convinced. For now, the Biden administration remains unwilling to revise its position limiting the use of US weapons. Meanwhile, a number of European countries including Germany and Italy have also called for caution. This reluctance to escalate the existing confrontation with Russia was on display in Brussels on Tuesday, when Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo announced plans to provide Ukraine with thirty F-16 fighter jets, but informed visiting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that the planes were not to be used inside Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has responded to mounting talk of an end to Western restrictions on attacks inside Russia by warning of “serious consequences” and hinting at a possible nuclear response. “If these serious consequences occur in Europe, how will the United States behave, bearing in mind our parity in the field of strategic weapons,” he commented in Tashkent this week. “Do they want a global conflict?”
Putin’s nuclear threats are nothing new, of course. Since the start of the Ukraine invasion, he has made numerous thinly-veiled references to nuclear escalation as part of efforts to intimidate the West and reduce the flow of weapons to Ukraine. These nuclear blackmail tactics have proved highly effective, encouraging Western leaders to embrace policies of escalation management that have significantly undermined the international response to Russia’s invasion.
The Kremlin dictator is now clearly hoping the same approach can deter the US and other key allies from giving Ukraine the green light to strike Russia using Western weapons. If he succeeds in this latest act of nuclear intimidation, it will bring Russian victory in Ukraine closer and set a dangerous precedent for the future of international security.
Peter Dickinson. ‘The time has come’: Calls grow to allow Ukrainian strikes inside Russia. Atlantic Council, May 28, 2024. URL : https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-time-has-come-calls-grow-to-allow-ukrainian-strikes-inside-russia/ (consulté le 29Mai24)
US election 2024
US election: its impact on Europe
May 24, 2024
The outlook for US security guarantees should Mr Trump retake the presidency is the issue causing the most consternation in Europe in the run-up to the US election. Mr Trump is often unpredictable, but his criticism of countries that do not meet NATO’s target of defence spending amounting to 2% of GDP has been consistent. In recent comments he has taken his long-standing characterisation of these countries as “freeloaders” to another level by suggesting that the US might not come to their aid in the event of a Russian invasion, as NATO’s Article 5 requires. This has prompted much concern: in 2023, 20 of the 31 NATO members failed to meet the 2% spending target (although the countries bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine all did, bar Norway). Mr Trump has even floated the idea of the US withdrawing from NATO; however, this is highly unlikely, as it would need congressional approval.
What we consider more likely from a Trump presidency is a spate of decisions aimed at putting severe pressure on European NATO members to step up their spending and become more autonomous in defence. This could include withdrawing from joint exercises, reducing the number of US troops on the ground, cutting relevant spending and continuing to sow doubts about the US’s commitment to Article 5 of the alliance. In response, we would expect a more serious push in the EU towards boosting defence capabilities, including greater co-operation with the UK (where the defence spending target has recently been raised to 2.5% of GDP). Still, there are limitations to what could be achieved in the short to medium term given the degree of fragmentation in the current EU system, as well as bureaucratic and industrial bottlenecks. US military contractors stand to benefit most.
Ukraine’s future in the balance
The most consequential security policy shift that we could expect from a Trump presidency concerns the level of US support for Ukraine. Under a Biden administration we would expect aid to be eroded to a level sufficient to stabilise the front lines, but not enough for Ukraine to regain the land currently occupied by Russia (about one-fifth of the country). Under Mr Trump uncertainty is high, but we would expect a sharper reduction in military and financial support in order to force Ukraine to the negotiating table to end the war quickly. The risk, depending on how this is handled, is that it could damage the credibility of the Western countries that had promised to back Ukraine, undermine Western security guarantees more generally and potentially embolden expansionist powers. Fear of Russian revisionism in the Baltic states and Moldova would spike in this scenario. NATO is already considering a plan to lock in €100bn of spending for Ukraine over five years.
A potential shock to US-EU trade
On trade policy, we would expect Mr Biden, for the most part, to co-operate with allies and compete with rivals. Mr Trump, in contrast, would probably prefer to compete with everyone, while also being less predictable and more antagonistic than Mr Biden. This is significant because the two economies are highly integrated: the US is the EU’s largest trade partner (buying a fifth of EU exports in 2023) and its largest investment destination. The US also ran trade deficits—which Mr Trump abhors—with 20 of the 27 EU member states last year. In this context, Mr Trump’s threat to impose a blanket 10% tariff on all of the US’s trading partners represents a major potential shock to the EU economy. Of course, such a course of action would face both legal and congressional hurdles, so its feasibility remains far from clear—and even if implemented, the EU might be able to secure exemptions. In the worst-case scenario, if tariffs were imposed and the EU retaliated with tariffs on US goods, this would be highly inflationary, damaging growth in both economies.
We see three specific issues to watch on the US-EU trade policy front:
- US tariffs on EU steel (at 25%) and aluminium (at 10%) are currently suspended until 2025. Mr Biden would probably keep these suspended as leverage in ongoing trade negotiations. Mr Trump would probably reimpose them immediately. This would exacerbate the EU’s decline in global market share for such energy-intensive goods, after an initial hit when European gas prices spiked in 2022.
- US tariffs on automotive imports were a threat during Mr Trump’s first presidency, and, although they were not imposed by the necessary deadline in 2019, could make a reappearance should he win a second term. EU carmakers would be vulnerable.
- Plans for digital services taxes (DSTs) are currently on hold during negotiations on the OECD’s global tax deal. We expect that Mr Biden would keep the US involved in this, even though he might not finally endorse the treaty. In contrast, Mr Trump would probably exit the agreement—prompting the suspended DSTs to be imposed. These would be most damaging for US tech firms, and could prompt a tit-for-tat trade war.
Industrial policy: green subsidies and China de-risking
On climate policy, a win for Mr Trump would mean a significant shift in the US stance. Mr Biden and Mr Trump have opposing views on climate change, with Mr Biden prioritising investment in green technologies and renewable energy in the almost US$400bn Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), while Mr Trump has promised to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, the international climate change treaty, and invest in fossil fuels. There would be upside risks for investment in Europe from Mr Trump’s plans to slow down IRA subsidies for investments in renewable energies, batteries and electric vehicles (EVs), as these have been drawing investment away from European firms. However, the bigger picture is that for the EU, losing the US as an ally in the fight against climate change would be a severe hit, as this would be likely to jeopardise global efforts to avoid a tipping point in temperatures. It could also embolden those in the EU pushing for short-term economic interests to be prioritised over the green transition.
On China, both candidates agree (roughly speaking) on a hawkish position, with Mr Biden announcing 100% tariffs on Chinese EVs in May. Under either president, European countries will come under pressure to clarify and harden their positions on China, with the current disunity (Germany versus France, and Hungary versus the rest of the EU) creating friction in the US-EU relationship. The shape of this would vary, though, with Mr Biden pushing for a multilateral position (painful for Europe given its greater economic exposure to China), and Mr Trump’s unilateral decision-making presenting unpredictable risks (such as Chinese goods flooding into the EU as a result of new tariffs on exports to the US). In particular, Mr Trump’s threat to revoke China’s “most-favoured nation” status and raise tariffs on all Chinese goods by up to 60% would have major repercussions for Europe.
We see two specific issues to watch on the industrial policy front:
- The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is now being phased in, with duties to be levied from 2026. For Mr Trump, this would be an automatic point of contention with the EU—even though the US will not be much disadvantaged by this, as its production of the goods affected is not highly carbon-intensive. It might even benefit, with its exports being taxed less than emerging market equivalents.
- Co-operation on diversifying suppliers of critical minerals would continue under Mr Biden, probably through the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC), where this has already begun. Under Mr Trump the TTC would probably not survive. However, shared US and EU progress on de-risking critical mineral supply chains away from China could potentially be achieved on a transactional rather than a co-operative basis.
Economist Intelligence. US election: its impact on Europe. May 24, 2024. URL:https://www.eiu.com/n/us-election-its-impact-on-europe/ (consulté le 29Mai24).
Israël-Palestine
Israel faces unprecedented challenges as legal and diplomatic pressure mounts
Abbas Al Lawati, CNN
Fri May 24, 2024
It’s been a tumultuous month for Israel. Never before has the Jewish state come under such intense and sustained international pressure from multiple fronts for its policies towards the Palestinians.
This week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu joined the ranks of world leaders branded as international pariahs when he became the target of the International Criminal Court, whose prosecutor is seeking an arrest warrant against him and his defense minister, Yoav Gallant for suspicion of war crimes and crimes against humanity during Israel’s war in Gaza.
The court has previously sought warrants against the likes of Sudan’s Omar Al Bashir, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi.
And on Friday, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Israel to immediately halt its controversial military operation in the southern Gaza city of Rafah, saying the humanitarian situation there is “disastrous” and expected to “intensify further.”
Seven months after Hamas attacked Israel, killing around 1,200 people and taking 250 hostages, Israel’s retaliatory war has failed to achieve its goals. Top Hamas leaders remain at large and 125 hostages remain captive in the enclave. Gaza is now in ruins and more than 35,000 Palestinians have died during Israel’s onslaught.
Pressure on Israel to end the war is mounting from all sides: US college campuses, international courts, American celebrities, Israel’s Western allies, and even the families of the Israeli hostages.
But the most significant of those may be the legal and diplomatic action taken against Israel this month.
Israeli officials are scrambling to contain the fallout. They have accused critics of antisemitism and vowed not to relent in the face of international pressure. “Even if Israel is forced to stand alone, we will stand alone, and we will continue to strike our enemies powerfully until victory,” Netanyahu declared in a fiery speech at the opening ceremony of Holocaust Remembrance Day this month.
Palestinian statehood
For years, Israeli officials have opposed unilateral recognitions of Palestinian statehood, fearing it would enable the Palestinians to bring Israel before international courts and weaken its position in future peace negotiations.
The Palestinians have therefore failed to gain full membership at the United Nations due to objections from the US, Israel’s closest ally and primary defender on the world stage. However, a non-binding vote at the UN General Assembly on May 10 showed overwhelming international support for an independent Palestinian state, leaving the US and a few of Israel’s allies isolated. Israel and the US maintain that a Palestinian state should only be established through a negotiated settlement.
But as Israel continues to reject the prospect of Palestinian independence, some states have chosen to act independently.
This week, Ireland, Spain and Norway announced plans to formally recognize a Palestinian state, saying they hope the move would prod other European nations to follow suit.
“We live in a time in world history where doing the bare minimum is both heroic and insufficient. That is why we cannot stop,” Spanish Deputy Prime Minister Yolanda Díaz said in a video posted on her X page. “Palestine will be free from the river to the sea,” she added, using a pro-Palestinian protest slogan that Israel says calls for its destruction, a charge rejected by those who use it.
The move prompted swift condemnation from Israel, which recalled its ambassadors from all three countries.
Aside from international efforts to end the war, Netanyahu is also under intense pressure domestically to strike a deal with Hamas to bring back the hostages. With hostage-ceasefire talks stalled, relatives of the captives are pressing the prime minister to return to negotiation.
This week, the families of seven female Israeli soldiers captured by Hamas released graphic footage of their abduction to pile pressure on the government to secure their release.
But there were signs that the talks may resume. On Thursday, the Israeli war cabinet directed the country’s negotiating team to resume talks, without saying when they’ll take place, and CIA Director Bill Burns has traveled to Europe to try to get the deal back on track, a US official told CNN, adding that the Israelis are “very engaged.”
Quandary for Israel’s allies
The cases brought before the ICJ and ICC have tested Western states’ commitment to the rules-based international order as they struggle to navigate the increasing legal actions against their ally in these courts.
This has created a rift between Israel’s Western allies and a growing coalition of Global South countries spanning Asia, Africa, and South America that are increasingly vocal in their calls for Israel to be held accountable for its actions in Gaza.
In a recent case at the ICJ, Germany was compelled to defend its arms sales to Israel against allegations of “facilitating genocide” brought by Nicaragua. Despite the pressure, the court rejected the demand for an immediate halt to Germany’s arms exports to Israel.
Meanwhile, the ICC’s decision to pursue arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant has divided Israel’s Western allies.
In an interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour, Karim Khan, the ICC’s prosecutor, recounted a conversation with a senior leader who remarked: “This court is built for Africa and for thugs like Putin,” underscoring the complexities surrounding international legal proceedings.
While the US and the United Kingdom have denounced the move, European nations such as France, Germany, and others have affirmed the independence of the court and have not ruled out the possibility of arresting Israeli officials if they enter their territory following the issuance of a warrant.
The court is also pursuing warrants against three top Hamas officials: Ismail Haniyeh, Yahya Sinwar, and Mohammed Deif. A panel of judges at the ICC is still deliberating on whether to issue these warrants.
The response to the warrant request has been particularly fierce in the US Congress, where a bipartisan effort to penalize the ICC is underway, potentially including sanctions. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken plans to work with Congress on legislation to penalize the ICC.
“If they do this to Israel, we’re next,” Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, who has led the efforts against the ICC in Congress, told a Senate hearing this week – a reminder that however much pressure Israel is under, it still has one very powerful friend.
Abbas Al Lawati. Israel faces unprecedented challenges as legal and diplomatic pressure mounts. CNN, May 24, 2024. URL: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/24/middleeast/israel-isolation-deepens-icj-gaza-rafah-analysis-intl/index.html (consulté le 29Mai24)