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Conflit en Ukraine

Gen. David Petraeus: How the war in Ukraine will end
CNN, Tue February 14, 2023
The war in Ukraine is at a stalemate, but that doesn’t mean it’s not changing. General David Petraeus predicts the war will look different this year with significant offensives likely staged by the two sides. Overall, the war continues to demonstrate basic weaknesses in Russia’s military, which was once thought to be one of the most capable in the world.
Petraeus has spent decades studying warfare and practicing its application. He was the US and coalition commander of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and later served as director of the CIA. He earned his Ph.D. from Princeton with a dissertation on the Vietnam War and the lessons the American military took from it. Petraeus is also the co-author, with British historian Andrew Roberts, of the forthcoming book, “Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine.”
As we approach the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, I asked Petraeus to reflect on the larger lessons of the war.
He says the Russians have lost many battles because of multiple failures of their military culture, doctrine, organizational structures, training and equipping. While Petraeus says this is in many ways the first open-source war, other aspects are being fought with Cold War tactics and weapons – albeit with upgraded capabilities, drones and precision munitions.
Petraeus, who criticized the Biden administration’s withdrawal of Afghanistan, strikes a different tone on Ukraine. He says the President’s team has done a very impressive job of leading NATO and the West to counter the Russian invasion, though there have been times he would have liked to have seen decisions to provide certain weapons systems (such as western tanks and longer-range precision munitions) made sooner than they were.
The enormous US and western support of Ukraine means, Petraeus observes, that while the Russians may be preparing to send hundreds of thousands of soldiers into Ukraine in a new offensive, they will face off in the coming months with better-trained and better-organized Ukrainian soldiers armed with American longer-range missiles, armored vehicles and a tremendous amount of ammunition. And Petraeus says his money is still on the Ukrainians.
Meanwhile, as Petraeus notes, though Russian President Vladimir Putin set out to Make Russia Great Again with his invasion of Ukraine, he has, instead, achieved exactly that with the NATO alliance.
We conducted the interview over email.
Bergen: Who’s winning the war?
Petraeus: It is not Russia. Russia has, after all, lost the Battles of Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv; failed to take the rest of Ukraine’s southern coast (not even getting through Mykolaiv, much less to the major port at Odesa).
It has lost what it had gained in Kharkiv province. And it has had to withdraw its only forces west of the Dnipro River in Kherson province because the Ukrainians made the vital bridge connections to those forces impassable, took out the headquarters and logistics sites supporting those forces, and isolated them from the rest of the Russian elements east of the river.
That said, the battle lines since the withdrawal of the forces west of the Dnipro last fall have been fairly static, although Russian forces have made grinding, incremental and very costly gains in villages around Bakhmut in southeast Ukraine. And the Ukrainians are having to commit additional forces to defend the areas under pressure.
So, the situation is essentially a stalemate at present, albeit with Russia making costly attacks in several areas, and with both sides building up forces for offensive operations expected in the late winter (likely the Russians) and spring/summer (the Ukrainians).
The side that generates the most capable, well-trained and well-equipped forces by then will make the most significant gains. And my bet is on Ukraine in that regard.
Bergen: What are the lessons of the Ukraine War for the future of warfare?
Petraeus: I think we should recognize that, with a few exceptions, Ukraine is not the future of warfare. In large measure, it is what we would have seen had the Cold War turned hot in the mid-1980s – with largely Cold War weapons systems (albeit with some modernization).
We are, however, seeing some glimpses and hints of what the future of warfare might look like. We see the Ukrainian use of drones (of only modest range and capability) as aerial observers identifying Russian headquarters and other targets for the precision munitions the US has provided (which will double in range from 70-80 kilometers to 150 kilometers when the just announced US precision munitions arrive in Ukraine).
We see the impact of sophisticated, western-provided fire-and-forget shoulder-launched anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. We have seen the impact of select use of medium-range anti-ship missiles. And we have seen use of offensive cyber capabilities, though not with enormous success, by the Russians.
Perhaps most notably, of course, we see a war taking place, for the first time, in a context that includes the widespread presence of smart phones, internet connectivity, and social media and other internet sites.
But, again, these are just hints of what the future of war between advanced powers would be. In such a conflict, the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems would be incomparably more capable; precision munitions would have vastly greater range, speed and explosive power.
And there would incomparably greater numbers of vastly more capable unmanned systems (some remotely piloted, others operating according to algorithms) in every domain – not just in the air, but also at sea, sub-sea, on the ground, in outer space, and in cyberspace, and operating in swarms, not just individually!
And every intelligence and strike capability will be integrated and connected by advanced command, control, communications and computer systems.
I recall an adage back in the Cold War days that stated, “If it can be seen, it can be hit; if it can be hit, it can be killed.” In truth, we didn’t have the surveillance assets, precision munitions and other capabilities needed to truly “operationalize” that adage in those days. In the future, however, just about everything – certainly every platform, base and headquarters – will be seen and thus be susceptible to being hit and destroyed (unless there are substantial defenses and hardening of those assets).
Imagining all this underscores, of course, that we must take innumerable actions to transform our forces and systems. We must deter future conflict by ensuring that there are no questions about our capabilities or our willingness to employ them – and also by doing everything possible to ensure that competition among great powers does not turn into conflict among them.
Bergen: Several years back, some people were calling NATO obsolete. Is it?
Petraeus: This question gets at one of the ironies of the situation. Putin set out to “Make Russia Great Again.” However, what he has done is make NATO great again – with two very capable, historically neutral powers (Finland and Sweden) seeking NATO membership; with substantially increased defense spending by NATO members, most notably Germany; with augmentation of NATO forces in the Baltic states and eastern Europe; and with the greatest unity among NATO members since the end of the Cold War.
Thanks to Putin, the description of NATO as suffering from “brain death” by French President Macron in late 2019 has turned out to be more than a bit premature.
Bergen: Is the Russian military’s performance in Ukraine surprising to you?
Petraeus: Not completely. In an interview with The Atlantic published shortly before the Russian invasion, I explained the considerable difficulties I expected Russia would encounter and noted that an invasion force of some 190,000 was much less than what likely would be required, especially if the Ukrainians proved to be as determined as I thought they would be (and they have been even more so).
Beyond that, though, even I didn’t foresee how miserably the Russians would perform.
Bergen: Is Russia failing because of failures of intelligence? Failures of its conscripts? Failures of Russian military culture? All the above?
Petraeus: All of the above and more. The list is long, including poor campaign design; wholly inadequate training (what were they doing for all those months they were deployed on the northern, eastern, and southern borders of Ukraine?); poor command, control, and communications; inadequate discipline (and a culture that condones war crimes and abuse of local populations); poor equipment (exemplified by turrets blowing off of tanks when fires ignite in them); insufficient logistic capabilities; inability to achieve combined arms effects (to employ all ground and air capabilities effectively together); inadequate organizational architecture; lack of a professional noncommissioned officer corps; a top-down command system that does not promote initiative at lower levels and pervasive corruption that undermines every aspect of their military – and the supporting military-industrial complex.
Bergen: So, do we not have to worry about Russia as a “great power” anymore?
Petraeus: Not at all. Russia still has enormous military capacity and is certainly still a nuclear superpower, as well as a country with enormous energy, mineral and agricultural blessings. It also has a population (about 145 million) that is nearly double that of the next largest European countries (Germany and Turkey, each just more than 80 million).
And it is still led by a kleptocratic dictator who embraces innumerable grievances and extreme revanchist views that severely undermine his decision-making.
Bergen: You know the observation sometimes attributed to Stalin: “Quantity has a quality all its own.” Russia has a far bigger population than Ukraine: Will that make a critical difference to the Ukraine war over the long term?
Petraeus: It could if Putin mobilized all of Russia successfully. However, to date, the mobilizations have been partial, as Putin seems to fear how the country might respond to total mobilization. In fact, reportedly, more Russian men left the country than reported to the mobilization stations in response to the latest partial call-up of reserves.
Nonetheless, it is estimated that as many as 300,000 new recruits and mobilized reservists are being sent to the frontlines, with up to 100,000-150,000 more on the way. And that is not trivial – because quantity does, indeed, matter.
Bergen: But is Napoleon correct in this case: “In war, the moral is to the physical as three is to one” – and Ukrainian morale seems to be higher.
Petraeus: That is a huge factor. Ukrainians sees the ongoing conflict as their War of Independence, and they have responded accordingly. President Volodomyr Zelensky has been positively Churchillian in rallying all Ukrainians to the service of their country as it fights for its national survival.
Thus, Ukrainians know what they are fighting for, while it is not clear that the same is true of many of the Russian soldiers, a disproportionate number of whom are from ethnic and sectarian minorities in the Russian Federation.
Moreover, Ukraine has, to date, done a better job than Russia of recruiting, training, equipping, organizing and employing additional forces – enabled by the extraordinary support provided by the US (more than $26 billion in arms, ammunition, and other security assistance since the beginning of the latest invasion) and other NATO and western countries. And I think we will see further evidence of this when Ukraine launches its counter-offensive in the spring or summer.
Bergen: What technologies have proven key to Ukrainian successes in this war? Several newish technologies seem to have proven important: Elon Musk’s Starlink mobile satellite systems kept communications open for the Ukrainians after the Russians had partially destroyed the phone system and jammed it. US-supplied HIMARS precision rockets have decimated Russian targets. Clearview AI, a controversial facial recognition technology used by some US police departments, has enabled the Ukrainians to identify Russian soldiers on the battlefield. TB2 Turkish armed drones have proven devastating to Russian targets and cheap commercial drones have helped the Ukrainians find targets.
Petraeus: All of those technologies have proven very important, and the Ukrainians have demonstrated enormous skill in adapting various technologies and commercial applications to enable intelligence gathering, targeting and other military tasks.
In fact, the Ukrainians have also shown exceptional abilities to “McGyver” solutions for a variety of problems – whether adapting Western missiles for use on MiG-29 fighter aircraft, repairing battle-damaged armored vehicles left on the battlefield by the Russians (remember the Ukrainians’ “tractor army”), or jamming Russian communications.
And the Ukrainians also have demonstrated a very impressive ability to learn how to employ new weapons systems and vehicles much more rapidly than anyone anticipated, as they want to master new capabilities as quickly as is possible and get back to the fight.
Bergen: How would you grade the Biden administration’s approach to the Ukraine war?
Petraeus: I think the Biden Administration has led NATO and the rest of the western world very impressively in responding to the Russian invasion – providing enormous quantities of arms, ammunition, and other material and economic assistance. And also guiding the effort to impose economic, financial and personal sanctions and export controls on Russia. (And I offer this, noting that I am not a member of a political party and was very critical of the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan and the way the withdrawal was conducted.)
To be sure, there have been times when I have felt that we should have decided to provide various capabilities (e.g., HIMARS, longer-range precision munitions, tanks, etc.) sooner than we have.
However, having sat around the Situation Room table in the West Wing of the White House, I know that it is far easier to second-guess from the outside than it is to make tough calls in office. But there are some additional capabilities (advanced drones, even longer-range precision munitions, fighter aircraft, and additional air defense and counter-drone capabilities) that I would like to see us provide sooner rather than later.
Eventually, for example, Ukraine is going to have to transition from eastern bloc aircraft (e.g., MiG-29s) to western ones (e.g., F-16s). There just aren’t any more MiGs to provide to them, and they reportedly have more pilots than aircraft at this point.
So, we might as well begin the process of transition, noting that it will take a number of months, regardless, to train pilots and maintenance personnel. All that said, again, I think the Administration has done a very impressive job and proven to be the indispensable nation in this particular situation – with important ramifications for other situations around the world.
Bergen: How would you grade Putin in this campaign? Has he got anything right?
Petraeus: Putin has earned a failing grade to date. Let’s recall that the first and most important task of a strategic leader is to “get the big ideas right” – that is, to get the overall strategy and fundamental decisions right. Putin clearly has failed abysmally in that task, resulting in a war that has made him and his country a pariah, set back the Russian economy by a decade or more (losing many of Russia’s best and brightest, and prompting over 1,200 western companies to leave Russia or reduce operations there), done catastrophic damage to the Russian military and its reputation and put his legacy in serious jeopardy.
That said, we should not underestimate Putin. He still believes that Russia can “out-suffer” the Ukrainians, Europeans, and Americans in the same way that Russians out-suffered Napoleon’s army and Hitler’s Nazis. And the US and our NATO and western allies and partners need to do all that we can, as quickly as we can, to enable Ukraine and prove Putin wrong.
Bergen: The quasi-private Wagner Group is the force that Putin sends into the meat grinder of the toughest battles. Any thoughts on using mercenaries, many of whom are convicts, as a tactic?
Petraeus: What Russia has done with what are, in essence, mercenaries, as you note, is somewhat innovative – but also essentially inhumane, as it entails throwing soldiers (many of them former convicts) into battle as cannon fodder, and with little, if any, concern for their survival.
These are not the tactics or practices that, at the end of the day, foster development of well-trained, disciplined, capable, and cohesive units that have trust in their leaders and soldiers on their left and right.
Bergen: What are the lessons of Ukraine for the Chinese if they were to stage an invasion of Taiwan, which would not be over a neighboring land border but over a 100-mile body of water? Does the sinking of the Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea navy, reshape how the Chinese might think about this question?
Petraeus: As a general observation, I think the developments in Ukraine have to be a cautionary tale for any country around the world contemplating a very challenging military operation – especially if that country’s forces have not engaged in major (or any) combat operations in many decades.
And especially if the target of such an operation has a population willing to fight fiercely for its survival and be supported by major powers – not just militarily but with substantial economic, financial, and personal sanctions and export controls.
Bergen: Putin has hinted at using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine: Is that plausible? What would/should the US response be were that to happen?
Petraeus: It is certainly possible that Putin could order Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Peter, and we should be concerned about that possibility. However, that would be an incredibly bad decision on his part, as use of such weapons would result in Russia being in a worse situation than it was before their use, rather than a better situation.
And it is critical that the leaders of the US and other western nations – and of China and India, as well – convey clearly and repeatedly to Putin that the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons for Russia would, indeed, be “catastrophic,” to quote US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.
Bergen: Is this the first truly open-source war? The war in Ukraine is being fought in part on social media by Zelensky; commercial overhead satellites capture Russian battle groups moving around in real-time, and the social media accounts of Russian mercenaries in the Wagner Group document what they are doing.
Petraeus: Yes, I believe it is. This is the first war in which smartphones and social media have been so widely available and also so widely employed. The result is unprecedented transparency and an extraordinary amount of information available – all through so-called “open sources.”
Bergen: What does Putin want?
Petraeus: In the long term, Putin still wants to deny Ukraine its sovereignty and make it part of the Russian Federation. In Putin’s grievance-filled, revisionist version of history, Ukraine does not have a right to exist as an independent country.
That said, in the short term, having failed to take control of Kyiv and replace President Zelensky with a pro-Russian figure, Putin is seeking to expand the area of Ukraine controlled by Russian forces. Particularly in the southeastern part of Russia, and to solidify Russian control over the provinces that connect Russia with Crimea in the so-called land bridge, so that Russia does not have to rely solely on the Kerch Strait Bridge for connection with Crimea.
Bergen: Does Putin have a plan? Or is he just improvising?
Petraeus: Well, Putin recently made General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff, the commander of the war in Ukraine, presumably to ensure that the Russian Military and Ministry of Defense are doing all that they can to generate additional forces for the battlefield in Ukraine. And Russia has been seeking additional arms, ammunition, and weapons systems from other countries – such as Iran and North Korea – to make up for the shortfalls in production of Russia’s military industries that are constrained by export controls.
Beyond that, it appears that Russia is massing replacement soldiers and additional units to launch an offensive to take the portions of Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in the southeast, that they do not control – while also establishing defensive positions in depth in other areas that they control in the south.
That said, there does not seem to be a particularly innovative new plan, given the limitations of the professional capabilities of the Russian forces and their demonstrated inability to generate “combined arms effect” – to integrate the actions of tanks with infantry, artillery/mortars, engineers, explosive ordnance disposal, electronic warfare, fixed and rotary wing close air support, air defenses, effective command and control, drones, etc.
In the absence of that, we will likely see more of what we have seen in the past – Russian commanders throwing recently mobilized, inadequately trained, and poorly equipped soldiers into tough fights. And supported by massive artillery and rocket fires (assuming they can maintain the supply of artillery rounds and rockets), to achieve grinding, costly, incremental gains – with, perhaps, an occasional limited breakthrough.
And all of this will be happening while we await the Ukrainian offensive that will be launched in the spring or summer, with much better trained, better equipped and more capable Ukrainian forces.
Bergen: How will the next stage of the war be different from the first year?
Petraeus: There will be several new features this year, most significantly the additional capabilities on the Ukrainian side: Western tanks and infantry fighting vehicles; longer-range and larger precision munitions for the US-provided HIMARS (high mobility artillery rocket systems) that will enable precise strikes out to 150 kilometers (twice the range of the current precision munition); additional air defense systems of various types; augmented air defenses and additional wheeled armored vehicles, as well as enormous quantities of additional ammunition of all types.
Beyond that, I believe we will see Ukrainian forces that are much more capable than the Russians at achieving the kind of combined arms effects that I described earlier and that thus enable much more effective offensive operations and can unhinge some of the Russian defenses. We may not see all this, however, until the spring or even summer, given the amount of time required for Ukrainian forces to receive and train on the new western tanks and other systems.
Meanwhile, in addition to the Russian offensive I mentioned earlier, I fear we will also see additional Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure with Russian missiles and rockets, as well as with Iranian-provided drones – which underscores the importance of doing all that we can to further constrain the Russian arms industries and also those of Iran.
Bergen: In 2003, at the beginning of the Iraq War, you famously asked a rhetorical question: “Tell me how this ends?” For the war in Ukraine: How does this end?
Petraeus: I think it ends in a negotiated resolution, when Putin recognizes that the war is unsustainable on both the battlefield (where Russia has in the first year likely taken many times the losses that the USSR took in nearly a decade in Afghanistan) and on the home front (which has been heavily impacted by economic, financial, economic, and personal sanctions and export controls).
Also when Ukraine reaches the limits of its ability to withstand missile and drone strikes, getting a Marshall-like plan (developed by the US and G7) to help rebuild the country, and gaining an ironclad security guarantee (either NATO membership or, if that is not possible, a US-led coalition guarantee).
A security guarantee will be critical to enabling the success of the reconstruction effort and attracting outside investment.
Peter Bergen. Gen. David Petraeus: How the war in Ukraine will end, Tue February 14, 2023, CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/14/opinions/petraeus-how-ukraine-war-ends-bergen-ctpr/index.html (Consulté le 28/02/2023)
Taiwan

Will Russia’s struggle in Ukraine help Taiwan — or hurt it?
Erin Hale. 23 Feb 2023
In the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Beijing and Moscow doubled down on their close relationship.
While Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin have a long history of working together, they publicly cemented their ties with a “no-limits” partnership just weeks before the war began.
The timing of the meeting and the subsequent invasion, after the Beijing Winter Olympics had concluded, led many observers to wonder whether Xi knew the war was coming. They also wondered, as Russian troops rolled into Ukraine, whether Taiwan was next.
Superficially at least, Ukraine and Taiwan appear to have much in common. Both are democracies whose territories have historically been claimed by much larger and better-armed neighbours. Beijing has long pledged to “reunify” with Taiwan by force or by peace by 2049, the year the Chinese Communist Party has set for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, 100 years after their victory in the country’s Civil War.
Tensions across the Taiwan Strait rose further last August as Nancy Pelosi, then the United States House of Representatives speaker, became the highest-ranking US official to visit Taipei in 25 years. China responded with a series of war exercises around Taiwan and ramped up its rhetoric. In 2022, Beijing sent a record 1,737 flights into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone, which includes the airspace around Taiwan and the coast of China, according to data compiled by Gerald C Brown and Ben Lewis, independent defence analysts who track such incursions. This was more than the combined numbers for the previous four years.
Now, on the eve of the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s struggles to make advances in the war have once again given rise to questions about what lessons China may have learned from its close ally. Will China conclude that it might be better to attack Taiwan before it is better prepared to defend itself? Or has Putin’s war shown the perils of rushing into such a conflict?
The short answer: Predicting China’s behaviour is a challenge because its decision-making is opaque to much of the outside world. Instead, China watchers often look at past actions and subtle changes, such as in the wording of official statements. From these, analysts interviewed by Al Jazeera reached a similar conclusion: While there is reason to worry in the long term, China is unlikely to attack Taiwan soon.
Xi is no hot-head
Unsurprisingly, the question of when and if China plans to invade Taiwan is firmly on the radar of the US intelligence community. CIA Director William Burns recently said although Xi was likely “unsettled” by Russia’s failures in Ukraine, he had still told China’s military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.
“We know as a matter of intelligence that he’s instructed the People’s Liberation Army to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion,” Burns was quoted as saying at a recent Georgetown University event. “Now, that does not mean that he’s decided to conduct an invasion in 2027, or any other year, but it’s a reminder of the seriousness of his focus and his ambition.”
Yet there are key differences between Xi and Putin that are likely to steer the Chinese leader away from pursuing an early attack on Taiwan, experts suggested.
“One of the assessments is that Putin acted very impulsively because of his imperial ambitions, and he has his own worldview,” Tai Ming Cheung, director of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, San Diego, told Al Jazeera.
“Xi, I think, he’s much more pragmatic. He’s very cautious. I don’t think he’s hot-headed enough and he’s not a risk taker, and an invasion against Taiwan is one of the biggest acts that he would do. It’s a very high-wire act and the chances of success are not clear.”
If a full-scale invasion did not go by plan, Cheung said, China could face “very, very severe” consequences, and Xi might not be willing to take such a gamble right now.
China would also struggle to weather economic implications, like a blockade or further sanctions in addition to ones that the West has already imposed, at a time when its economy has slowed, said Ivy Kwek, a China fellow at the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think tank that analyses global conflict risk. Its international reputation would also be severely damaged, she said.
Bonnie Glaser, managing director of German Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific programme, told Al Jazeera that at the moment, “common sense” would suggest that Beijing is wary of following in Russia’s footsteps, even as it continues with what she described as “grey zone tactics” intent on lowering Taiwanese morale. These include misinformation campaigns and cyber-warfare, as well as diplomatic and economic pressure aimed at isolating Taiwan’s government.
Reading the Xi leaves
Though Ukraine and Taiwan might appear to have plenty in common, analysts caution against drawing direct parallels between the Eurasian and East Asian hotspots.
Where Russia and Ukraine share a land border, Taiwan lies 180km (112 miles) across the Taiwan Strait from China, requiring an invasion force by sea supported by air power. Landing in Taiwan is notoriously difficult due to its mountainous geography and limited number of beaches suitable for such an operation.
Despite a number of tense moments over the past year, Beijing has yet to rule out “peaceful reunification” as an alternative option to war. Also important is to consider what has not been said. During the recent 20th Congress in October, when the Communist Party typically sets the agenda for the next five years, Xi notably did not change his messaging on Taiwan, nor did he signal “urgency to achieve reunification”, Glaser said. There is also “no clear evidence of intent”, she said.
Last week, Beijing also welcomed visitors from Taiwan’s opposition party, the more China-friendly Kuomintang, further underlining that it has not ruled out alternatives to war.
Much of the tension in the Taiwan Strait over the past year might not be a sign of military preparations. It could be more a “result of a deterioration of the US-China relationship – particularly after Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last year – than a direct consequence of the war on Ukraine,” Kwek told Al Jazeera. She predicted that if new US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy visits Taiwan later this year, as has been indicated by Washington, it will further increase tensions.
Greater US attention, however, may also act as a short-term deterrent against Chinese use of force, she said. Since the Ukraine war began, the US has worked to shore up security partnerships with regional allies like Australia, Japan and the Philippines, and has fast-tracked a bill to authorise up to $10bn in defence assistance to Taiwan. It has cleared the sale of anti-tank systems worth $180m to the self-governed territory.
What war is China willing to fight?
Meanwhile, China has been quickly learning lessons about conventional wars in the 21st century, even as it engages in a major military modernisation campaign.
It had initially set itself the goal of rivalling the US in military power by 2035. The timeline was updated in October 2020 to the year 2027, but that likely reflects concerns about the US more than lessons from any other geopolitical conflict, said University of California’s Cheung.
Putin’s war has, if anything, posed serious questions for Beijing’s leadership.
The US wars in the Middle East since the 1990s, especially the Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, “have been very short, very intensive, very high-tech wars”, Cheung said. The current war between Russia and Ukraine has been very different.
“So we get these two very contrasting wars, one is quick and decisive and the other is drawn out, attritional, and is grinding to a stalemate,” he said. That has implications for China in terms of what war it is “going to be preparing to fight”.
The war in Ukraine might also have re-emphasised to Beijing the need for modern, cutting-edge tools. China has likely seen the importance of weapons systems such as hypersonic missiles, Yurii Poita, head of the Asia-Pacific section at Ukraine’s Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies, told Al Jazeera.
Russia debuted its arsenal of hypersonic missiles in Ukraine, using them to destroy underground arsenals at the start of the war and to attack the port city of Odesa. China is expected to continue to invest in further developing the technology, Poita said. Moving five and even six times the speed of sound, these missiles are nearly impossible to intercept and can evade early warning systems.
Another key lesson that Xi has likely drawn is that blackmail is “very effective against the West”, said Poita. In February 2022, Putin raised the alert on Russia’s nuclear forces and then in September 2022 told the world he was not “bluffing” about Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Threats like these have kept Western troops from entering the conflict or imposing a no-fly zone around Russia.
Alongside its own nuclear arsenal and stockpile of missiles, China has a clout far beyond Russia as the “world’s factory” and second-largest economy, which means it can engage in both nuclear and economic blackmail.
Taiwan’s resilience
But Taiwan has also been taking notes and has seen how the Ukrainian military has used relatively inexpensive weapons in asymmetric warfare, Poita told Al Jazeera, including small and portable Stinger surface-to-air missiles, Javelin anti-tank missiles, and harpoon anti-ship missiles.
Its government has seen how basic technology — FM radio equipment to commercial satellites — can play a key role in keeping citizens informed while also gaining global support, Crystal Chen-yi Tu, an assistant research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defence and Security Research, told Al Jazeera.
Elon Musk’s Starlink satellites have provided Ukraine and its military with ongoing internet access through the war. FM stations have played an important role in maintaining civilian morale by providing news, music and entertainment, especially to those stuck in air raid shelters.
Media and NGO reports have also played a decisive role in the Ukraine war. The most stunning example may be news of Russian war crimes in Bucha in the early days of the invasion, after which the number of countries providing military support jumped from three to 35, according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
While Taiwan has yet to create a territorial defence force like Ukraine – which China could view as a provocation – its President Tsai Ing-wen raised mandatory national service in January for male citizens from four months to one year. The move follows nearly eight years of efforts to strengthen the military, which was neglected for much of the 2000s due to its associations with Taiwan’s previous martial law era.
However, bolstering its national unity to work together and resist surrender could prove to be among Taiwan’s greatest strengths in the event of an attack, Mathieu Duchâtel, director of the Asia programme at France’s Institut Montaigne, told Al Jazeera.
Much of this involves solidifying Taiwanese identity as independent of China, a trend that has steadily grown over the past 30 years, according to regular polling. Ukraine has shown that pride in an independent identity is a powerful tool.
Duchâtel referred to what he described as Russia’s “misperception” about Ukraine and democratic societies more broadly — that they are weaker, and that their citizens prioritise consumption-driven lifestyles over all else.
“I think there is a similar Chinese feeling vis-a-vis Taiwan – you hear sometimes, ‘We just have to cut their access to the internet, and they would surrender,’” he said. “But I think China has to reconsider because the Ukraine war reveals the actual resilience of democratic societies.”
Erin Hale. Will Russia’s struggle in Ukraine help Taiwan — or hurt it? 23 Feb 2023. Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/2/23/will-russias-ukraine-struggle-help-taiwan-or-hurt (Consulté le 28 Fev 2023).
Hong Kong

Qui est John Lee, l'homme de la répression nommé chef exécutif de Hong Kong ?
John Lee prendra la tête de Hong Kong le 8 mai prochain 2022.
06 mai 2022 à 11:37 - mise à jour 06 mai 2022 à 13:19
Nous vous le disions le 4 avril dernier, la dirigeante Carrie Lam, 64 ans, ne rempile pas pour un deuxième mandat en tant que cheffe de l’exécutif à Hong Kong."Je vais achever mon mandat de cinq ans en tant que cheffe de l’exécutif le 30 juin et finir officiellement ma carrière de 42 ans dans le gouvernement", avait-elle annoncé à l’époque à la presse.
Averti en 2021 de cette décision, le comité de 1500 personnes chargé de désigner un chef exécutif s’était donc mis en quête d’un remplaçant. Et ce remplaçant n’est autre que John Lee, 64 ans, ancien chef de la sécurité de Hong Kong et unique candidat au poste de chef de l’exécutif de la ville.
John Lee sera officiellement désigné ce dimanche 8 mai à Pékin mais ne prendra ses fonctions que le 1er juillet, date du 25ème anniversaire de la restitution de Hong Kong à la Chine par le Royaume-Uni.
Qui est John Lee ?
Aujourd’hui marié et père de deux enfants, John Lee est né dans le quartier de Sham Shui Po, un endroit qui a grandement influencé sa carrière professionnelle. Intimidé et battu par des voyous du coin alors qu’il était enfant, John Lee refuse de suivre des études d’ingénieur préférant entrer dans la police.
35 ans plus tard, en 2012, il entre au gouvernement et renonce à sa nationalité britannique. Là, il se démarque rapidement. Les médias disent d’ailleurs de lui qu’il a bénéficié d’un "ascenseur en platine".
En 2017, il devient le chef des services de sécurité de Hong Kong. C’est lui qui est chargé de diriger la répression policière lors des gigantesques manifestations pro-démocratie de 2019, ainsi que la sévère reprise en main politique qui a suivi. Pour lui tout comme pour Pékin, ces manifestations relèvent d’un complot "terroriste" ourdi par des "forces antichinoises".
Ces actions et pensées lui valent d’une part de figurer sur une liste de personnalités chinoises et hongkongaises sanctionnées par les Etats-Unis pour avoir "sapé l’autonomie de Hong Kong et restreint la liberté d’expression ou de réunion", et d’autre part de gagner la confiance de Pékin. "Il est l’homme qui a réussi le test", affirme à l’AFP Lai Tung-kwok, son prédécesseur à la tête de la sécurité de Hong Kong.
Deux ans plus tard en 2021, il met un pied dans la fonction de chef de l’exécutif en devenant le numéro deux de Carrie Lam.
"Dans le passé, la Chine a pu faire des compromis en échange de bénéfices économiques", confie Charles Mok, ancien membre pro-démocratie du Conseil législatif désormais exilé, à l’AFP. "Mais désormais, Pékin semble souhaiter que les gens considèrent le monde comme un endroit rempli de menaces, et une loyauté sans faille au Parti comme la seule solution sûre.
Étranger au monde des affaires et de l’administration
Le comité fait encore preuve d’innovation avec cette nomination. En effet, si Carrie Lam était la première femme à exercer une telle fonction, John Lee est le premier homme à ne pas être issu du monde des affaires ou de l’administration, mais bien du monde policier. Un message fort si l’on en croit le spécialiste de la Chine contemporaine, chercheur et chargé de cours à l’Uliège, Eric Florence. "Contrairement à Carrie Lam, il n’a pas l’expérience des grands administrateurs traditionnellement formés à Hong Kong", confie-t-il. "Il a essentiellement des contacts avec le milieu policier et a toujours été très inflexible sur les manifestations de 2019 et ensuite sur les mesures prises dans le cadre de la loi de la sécurité nationale de l’été 2020 ou encore dans le cadre de mesures ayant réduit considérablement les libertés publiques."
En soutenant John Lee et en adoptant la loi sur la sécurité nationale – à laquelle ni Lee, ni Lam ne se sont opposés, le gouvernement central de Pékin souhaite "renforcer la mainmise sur Hong Kong" et remet ainsi en cause plusieurs articles de la loi fondamentale selon laquelle aucune administration chinoise du continent ne pourra administrer Hong Kong, affirme Eric Florence. Hong Kong ne peut être géré que par des autorités hongkongaises. Or, de plus en plus de personnel de la sécurité administrative est directement recruté en Chine.
"Les tribunaux demeurent dans une certaine mesure encore un des derniers remparts, toutes les autres barrières ont été levées par la loi de sécurité nationale. L’arrivée de John Lee confirme donc le glissement de paradigme dans la façon de gérer Hong Kong. La sécurité prime sur le reste, une digue a sauté."
Des propos que confirme Chien-yu Shih, spécialiste des questions de sécurité chinoise à l’institut pour la Défense nationale de Taïwan. "Pékin a cherché à savoir quelle personnalité politique était prête à suivre son discours." Selon lui, les dirigeants chinois continuent de se méfier des fonctionnaires de Hong Kong.
Des objectifs entre autres économiques
En devenant chef de l’exécutif, John Lee promet de faire de la "sécurité nationale" une de ses priorités. Il poursuivra d’ailleurs à ce titre la campagne de répression de la dissidence qu’a entamée Carrie Lam.
Mais selon l’AFP, c’est sur le terrain de l’économie que le nouveau dirigeant devra fournir de gros efforts. Depuis le début de la pandémie, les milieux d’affaires de la région se sont pratiquement coupés du monde. "J’espère qu’il pensera à la compétitivité internationale de Hong Kong et qu’il ne perdra pas son temps à faire adopter des lois sans utilité pour l’économie de la ville", indiquait à l’agence de presse française Danny Lau, dirigeant d’une association de patrons et de petites entreprises.
Wilquin, Maud (2022, 06 mai). Qui est John Lee, l'homme de la répression nommé chef exécutif de Hong Kong ?, RTBF, URL : https://www.rtbf.be/article/qui-est-john-lee-l-homme-de-la-repression-nomme-chef-executif-de-hong-kong-10987987 (consulté le 15/05/2022)