Résumé :
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The distribution of power within organizations (the structure) that are involved in conflicts has profound impact on conflict outcomes, argues Sinno (political science and Middle Eastern studies, Indian U.). He argues that whether oppositional organizations are centralized, decentralized, defined by a patron-client relationship, or exist in situations of multiplicity or fragmentation creates incentives for organizational members that affect the execution of such processes as formulation and implementation of strategy, coordination of activities, mobilizing resources, maintaining control and discipline, resilience in a hostile environment, attracting foreign aid, balancing intra-organizational cohesion and competition, and generation and preservation of knowledge. He applies this organizational theory to provide a detailed explanation of the evolution of consecutive Afghan conflicts since 1979. In the final chapter he goes beyond Afghanistan to test his theory against the outcomes of forty-one post-World War II ethnic, revolutionary, and secessionist conflicts in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas
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